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Close and ongoing collaboration between health care
professionals and the pharmaceutical drug, device,
and biotechnology industries is a fundamental and
necessary aspect of medical innovation. Companies
interact with health care providers in a variety of ways:
through product training sessions or conferences, sales
and promotional meetings, consulting or investment
arrangements, research and trial arrangements,
economic remuneration, grants, or charitable dona-
tions.' Indtustry-provider interactions aim to promote
public health through sharing and exchanging
information between health care professionals, who
have clinical experience and expertise and the health
care industry, which has the resources to expend on
innovative and critical treatments and technologies.
These collaborations between industry and health care
professionals save and improve the lives of millions
of patients through medical breakthroughs and daily
patient treatment.
The vita1 role of informa-
tion exchange in advanc-
ing nmedical technology
cnnot be dossnplayedk
IThe clinic'al experience
ad expertise of bealth
care profcssionals pro-
vides insvahnable insight
into industry rescarch
and dev elopmcnt and
initiates progrcss and
innosation. In a rccent
example of the essential
open floss of comnunication betsseen clinicians and
manufacturers. ph)ysicians relayed information to med-
ical dev ice companies about implanting metal plates
into children's skulls. Thbe teedback tionm phy sicians
prompted manufactuiers to lashion snmallei sized plates
customized for children, thercbs improsving the quality
of health caire foi a spccific population.
Opponents of ongoing collaborations between indus-
try and health care professionals express the belief
that each health care player holds a confiicting and ini-
tially irreconcilable stake against the other's interests.
Therefore, the mere appearance of such conflict draws
suspicion of untoward behaviors and raises legitimate
questions concerning the potential for prescriber bias.
A close relationship between industry and health care
professionals, however, does not necessarily indicate
inappropriate relations or a relationship that will hasve
a less beneficial effect on progress in health care. In
fact studies show that "fears that disclosed conflicts of
interest are leading to tainted, unreliable recommenda-
tions are unfounded." 4 This does not necessarily mean
that improper behavior does not arise out of interac-
tions in which there are conflicts of interest.' The
cases of-oore v. Regents of California6 and Gelsiger
v 7ustees of LOin ofPennsylvanial drew a signifi-
cant amount of public attention for the harm associ-
ated with research experiments in which physicians
held a financial interest. In Moore, treating physicians
influenced a patient's decision to undergo unnecessary
tests, leading to an outcome that advanced their own
gains rather than those of the patient. The California
Supreme Court held that by failing to disclose their
personal interests in the treatment the physicians did
not satisfy the duty to give informed consent, thereby
denying the patient the opportunity to properly balance
the risks and the benefits of continued treatment.
Also in the realm of clinical research, the Gelsinger
case associated the death of a teenage participant in
a University of Pennsylvania research study with the
principal investigator's conflicting financial interest
in the outcome of the study, which prompted attempts
to regulate or otherwise monitor physicians with
an interest in research.o Gelsinger also presents a
case where the industry-provider relationship was
automatically viewed as unseemly because something
went wrong."
T he information exchange works both ways. lealth
care protessionals olten iely on industry input
and training to properly and effectiv ely dispense
pharmiaceutical dr ugs anid devices. Wh ile promouting
the free exchange ot intormation betsseen health care
playeris, this approach tends to be controsversial sshen
it illsolsves seemingly extrasvagant gifts or paymaents
for meals, trav el, and constilting. Physsicians con-
tend, however, that "the best approach to optimize
cost effectiveness ol product prescribing is to promote
more, not less, interaction among all stakeholders
involved in healthcare delivery." Indeed, provided
that the industry presents information to a physician
without stipulation, the physician may decide freely
which course of treatment to recommend.
The main purpose of industry-provider interactions
is to promote an exchange of ideas and data
regarding a product, an innovative idea. or a medical
advancement.1 I na conflict of interest analysis, where
the conflict of interest is reviewed for its anticipated
impact, the promotion of medical technology and
innovation is generally the primary interest. For the
information exchange to be worth the valuable time
of health care professionals, however, ties with the
industry often involve monetary or non-monetary
incentives. For instance, secondary interests in the
interaction may be the fee provided in exchange for
a physician's consulting work. A secondary interest
might also be a provider's interest in a company or
the gain in reputation from association with a ground-
breaking treatment or technology. Both primary and
secondary interests are desirable. Although one may
have "a claim to priority" that undermines the integrity
of the first interest, in order to make the interaction
beneficial for all parties involved the challenge is to
ensure that both interests are realized.14 Collaboration
between these entities often gives rise to inherent
conflicts of interest because incentives in industry-
provider interactions are simultaneous and potentially
incompatible.
IL Current Efforts in Managing
Cont icts of Interest
In March and April of 2008, Congress responded to
the growing mindfulness, if not wariness of industry
interaction with health care providers and its eflects on
the provision of health care by introducing legislation
to regulate industry -provider interactions. Known as
the Phxsiciaii Pay meiits Sunshiine Yet, the hegislatioii
aims to "shed light" on collaborations in health care by
niaiidating quarterly disclosure of interactions resulting
in nionetary amounts oxver a certain threshold.16
By disclosing the existence of industry-provider
interaetioiis, the legislatioii einpowxers health care
consumers xwith informatioii about the dev elopment,
the procurement, and the distribution of drugs aiid
dev ices.
Disclosure legislation, such as the Physician Pay-
meiits Sunshine Act and other state regulation,
supplement efforts by industry trade associations to
create institutional codes of ethics. Media coverage
characterizes these efforts as aimed towards "reining
in doctors," but the codes recognize the shared
responsibility of the health care industry and providers
in preserving public trust." These approaches are
voluntary and set the standard within each industry
for the management of interactions with health care
providers while promoting the best interests of the
health care consumer. For instance, the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America's (PhRMA)
Code on Interactions with Health care Professionals
provides guidance for interactions ranging from
consulting arrangements to educational funding from
pharmaceutical companies.' Ihe Advanced Medical
Technology Association's (AdvaMed) Code of Ethics
on Interactions with Health Care Professionals provides
guidance on the promotion of ethical industry-provider
interactions in the device space.19
Legislative efforts, however, use disclosure as a means
of regulating industry-provider interactions. While
this is a reasonable and effective method of preventing
abuse and negating the questionable impression that
industry-provider ties often raise, it is important to
recognize that conflicts of interest necessarily arise in
all types of interactions where two or more intersecting
interests exist. Moreover, in some cases, the outcome
of an interaction that gives rise to an irresolvable
conflict of interest is so desirable that it should
nevertheless proceed. Where circumstances show that
an interaction provides infornation so compelling
and necessary, there is a rebuttable presumption that
the interaction should continue despite a conflict of
interest. This approach holds that industry influence
negatively affects a physician's decision-making
process and makes the assumption that by virtue of this
potentiality, the dual interests cannot co-exist unless
they pass the high "compelling circumstances" bar."
This approach is problematic because interactions that
are useful in providing meaningful outcomes, but not
necessarily "compelling" ones, are unable to proceed.
Indeed, conflicts of interest are so ubiquitous that the
benefits that aiise trom industry -piovider interactions
stall under the high bar set by the rebuttable presumption
approach.
The iterests of science and research are better serxved
xwhlen existing conflicts are nianaged, instead of disal-
lossed, because it is often the case that twxo iintersect-
ing iinterests can co-exist ini a maimer that allowxs both
to be tfulfilled. Unider tle managemcnt peirpctive, anL
advisory board may require an individual to recuse
him or herself firom involvement in a particular proj-
ect place any equity interest in a trust for the dura-
tion of the project, or encourage disclosure of conflicts
of interest to manage the conflict. IThe last require-
ment, disclosure, simultaneously satisfies the health
care professionals' desire to continue with a project, the
regulating body's interest in limiting untoward behav-
ior, and the health care consumer's need for informa-
tion with which he or she can make knowledgeable
decisions about treatment
options. Disclosure that
includes details providing
context for each interest
is necessary to determine
wsheiher ihe conflict of
itrest is manageable
in a wxay that renders its
outcome desirable despite
any initial reserxvations.21
This vital data aids health
care consumers in under-
4%standing contlicts of inter-
est in a way that does not
1preemptixvely find thenm
u nmanageable.
As the laigest health care insurer in the nation and a
major purchaser of pharmaceutical drugs. dev ices. and
biotechnolooy, the U.S. goxernment has a financial
interest in oxversccing any conflict of intcrcst that arises
bctwxeen the hcalth carc industry and hcalth carc pro-
fessionals to ensure that health care choices are made
in the patients best interest. T he goxvemnment's atten-
tion to conilicts of interest in medicine is therefore
aimed at controlling industry influence on prescribers'
decision-making.
Interactions that pronmote mnovation and information
sharing, hoxwexvei; are in the best interest of the pub-
lie. An) efforts to manage conficts of interest through
disclosure better serve health care consumers xwhen
tempered to encourage technological advancement.
A thoughttul analy sis ot the v alue ot managing con-
flicts of interest through disclosure includes an inquiry
into the trade-offs of prosviding "light" on industry
interactions. This article wxill suggest that disclosed
information xwhich is not properly managed through
oovemnent or institutional regulation may hinder
tcchnological progrcss and informxation exchange
betxwecn industry and health care proxviders. To ensure
that the bcnefits of disclosurc rcgulation outxweigh its
burdens, it is important to assess the information dis-
closed for its meaningfulness and for any unintended
effects on the health care sy stem. Finall, this article
wxill suggest that disclosure of a conflict of interest is
successtul because it advances the frundamental v alue
in health care of autonomy.
Industry only gains when its products and technologies
are implemented correctly and prescribed free of
unseemly behavior. Technical procedures require
that industry interact within health care professionals
in operating rooms., private practices, and learning
and training seminars without raising the specter of
untoward influence.2 Similarly, the financial support
that health care professionals, and the health care system
as a whole, acquire through industry is necessary to the
promotion of research and development. This circu-
lar relationship establishes a conflict of interest.
Atypical conflict ofinterest analysis calls for an inquiry
into whether secondary interests can exist without
jeopardizing the initial objectives of the industry-
provider interaction. If the primary interest in an
interaction between a pharmaceutical drug, device, or
biotechnology company and a health care professional
is collaboration towards an innovative medical
product that promotes a better and more efficient
health care system, then any secondary interests that
directly interfere with that goal create a conflict of
interest. A secondary interest may interfere either by
compromising the original goal with tangible negative
results (such as the Gelsinger case), or by affecting
the mere appearance of impropriety. Generally, part
of managing a conflict of interest includes acknowl-
edging its existence through disclosures made to the
public.Z Industry benefits from full disclosure of
its interactions with health care providers. Through
disclosure, industry has an opportunity to cast its pursuits
as driven not only by profit, but by the pioneering of
new and important technologies in medicine for the
betterment of health care. Moreover, industry has the
opportunity to explain the important and justifiable
reasons for its presence in a health care professional's
practice. Disclosures detailing the circumstances of
the industry-provider interactions help inform
interested parties about the goals pursued by industry
and the necessity for input from clinicians.
One of the benefits of disclosure legislation, which
figuratixely 'shines light" on industry inteiactions.
is the opportunity tor industry to embiace disclosure
as a incans by wxhich to shed the public perccption of
industrx as a' "dark force" and instcad emerge as a xvital
means towvard medical innoxvation and dev elopment.
Industiy 's 'bottom line" can, and does, co-exist wxith
the promotion of public healh. Sitmilarly, those ooals
can co-exist wxith the health care proxvider's interest in
fees, insvestmnent, or other monetary or non-monetary
gains.
Information exchanged through industry-provider interactions is so vital
and so meaningful to advances in health care that discouraging collaboration
based on the existence of a conflict of interest would ultimately cause more
harm than good to the greater health care system.26 Recently proposed
guidance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provided
clarity on its prohibition of "unlasw ful promotion" of a product in the
dissemination of off-label information in the form of medical or scientific
reference publications and medical journal articles.21 In its draft guidance,
the FDA recognized the "public health value to health care professionals of
receiving truthful and non-misleading scientific and medical information"
and that such uses may in cases "constitute a medically recognized standard
of care."28 lhe Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) also
recognizes the importance of impartiality and requires a neutral party to
review industry-funded studies prior to publication. T hese efforts reflect
recognition of the benefits arising from a health care professional in
possession of clinical data that can improve a pharmaceutical drug or device,
as well as assist a drug or device company by informing the company on
how to best implement or use a product. In other words, the value placed
on the exchange of information is often worth the risks that may arise from
a conflict of interest. Disclosure of industry ties does not automatically
negate the relationship. In more extreme instances, however, the specter
of the disclosure itself is so detrimental that it threatens to negate those ties
and the information attached to them.
I1,V LJ1 Un 1- \--restrained 1Disc"losturwe PMayHa rmi, *i't
Rather than Promote,\ the Primary Interest
of Itimproving iH-eain\Lt are 4by Ob1 str ucetin g
the Infoiirmation Shared
Although public disclosure of a conflict of interest in an industry-provider
interaction is possible (or may be made possible through efforts of the
parties involved), it is not necessarily inflormation that should or must
be shared it there are significant negative implications to its disclosure.
Much of the regulation aimed at diminishing conflicts of interest actually
regulates information exchange by setting standards for the types and
the timing of disclosures. The level of required disclosure implicates the
priorities that are placed on the information. To make informed value
judgments an inquiry into the value of disclosures must incorporate
questions around health care consumers' need to know certain information,
how the infonnation is made known, whether the need to know outweighs
the potential for unintended consequence of harming progress, and
ultinmately, harming the health care consumer.
Aprimary consequence for a company accused of nmaintaining untoward ties
xwith phy sicians is diminished reputation in the public eye>2 "Critics asVei;
and politicians echo that the most giievous casualty of conflict ot interest-
indeed of esven the appearance of it-is the public' ITrust."1o Public trust in
industiy is not easily regained. although industry's indiscretions are more
forgisvable than those of a health care practitionuer w5ho has a longer wxay
to fall based on a long-standing public perception as a trustworthy and
upstanding professional."
Although it has been suggested that pressure related to a managed care
system has the effect of "un-aligning" the interests of the health care provider
and consumer., physicians abide by the Hippocratic Oath, which bestows the
responsibility to do no harm and act in the best interest of the patient. " This
is not to suggest that industry-provider interactions go unchecked based on
the assumed honesty of physicians, but rather highlights the sense of trust
that embodies the profession.33 As an illustration, physicians are held to a
high legal standard of care that incorporates a sense of dependency on and
regard for their knowledge and experience. Under the learned intermediary
doctrine, for instance, physicians are charged with acting as the liaison
betsw een manufacturers and patients regarding the distribution and use
of pharmaceutical products.4 A recent case in Iexas acknowledged that
"Li]f the doctor is properly warned of the possibility ot a side effect and
is advised of the symptoms normally accompanying the side effect, it is
anticipated that iinjury to the patient will be avoided."3 As a result of this
public trust in the profession, attempts to regulate conflicts of interest in
health care arose significantly later than efforts in other fields."
As medicine becomes entangled in its function as a business, many questions
that conflicts of interest raise relate directly to the seemingly contradictory
role of the physician as a businessperson as well as a caretaker.7 Indeed,
it may be logical to suggest that collaboration in industry is another was
that "doctors escaped becoming victims of capitalism and became small
capitalists instead."3 The role of a physician somehow entangled in
capitalistic pursuits tends not to sit well with the public. As a result, alarm
bells go off when we observe a physician motivated by the botton-line or
an otherwise unseemly objective such as reputation of investment.
Disclosure allows affected parties to view industry-provider interactions
with "additional skepticism."39 The first message that disclosure sends is
that the health care provider holds an interest that conflicts with another
goal in an industry-provider interaction. Insofar as the interests are managed
or negated under the rebuttable presumption view, disclosure reveals that
the physician has nothing to hide and as a result garners public trust through
mere openness.40 Ihe second message that disclosure conveys, especially
if it lacks specificity, is that industry ties may influence a physician's
decision-making in a way that makes the care received untrustworthy.41
Because disclosures incite suspicion ofuntoward behavior, they often lead
to severe prophylactic measures to ensure that health care professionals
behave in acceptable w ays.42 These extreme measures may unintentionally
quell the exchange of information and the innovation that stems from this
exchange.
IThe Massachusetts legislature recently passed a bill that seeks to ban
industry gifts to (doctors tinder the reasoning that the mere appearance of
impropriety is enough to w5aiiant a severe iestriction of an industry -prosvider
interaction.4 T~Ihe cuitailing of industiy -prosvidei interactions Jails to take
into account the curbing of information sharing and exchange. As a result of
the distrust attachcd to their interactions sxith industrs, health care prosviders
wxillingly reject fees anld remuneration foi their time spent conlsulting xvith
pharmaceutical drug or dev ice companies in order to avoid suspicion that
may threaten their reputation. 44 For cxample, a reccnt \New orkt Times
article prcseited the stories of phy sicians wxho. after 'iitense scrutiny" for
accepting compensation for consulting or speaking with pharmaceutical
drug or device companies, now decline to accept any remuneration from
industry. One physician continued to pro-
vide services free of charge to a company
based on his belief that the work performed
for the company was vital to progress in
mecdicine.45 Another felt less incentive to
participate in these important interactions
without compensation for his time and
effots.46
................ BDis cIos ur\,--es ITha tDe v aIu e tUhe
Insofar as a moral imperativea to prov ide
the hest possible health care exists, it
< includes the duty to use the best possible
information asvailable. \When a drug or
S dev ice company possesses or learns of
data w ith respect to its product, it hears
a iesponsihility to share that information
with health care consumers through
phy sician intermediaiiest4 likewise
from the providei's perspective, possessing clinical
data creates a duty to share that infoimation vsith
manufacturers vsho are in the best position to use it in
a vsay that bcnefits paticnts. Thus, the fact that phsysi-
cians Ifust balance losing fees or losing trust is not the
sole issue in sanctioning indiistrx-provider interactions.
The health care sy stem also risks losing opportunities
to share svaluable information that promfotes sate and
effective innoxvation in medicine and leads to more
informed prescribing and other decision-making.
Mistrust regarding the sveracity and svalue of infounation
born out of interactions vshere a conflict of interest
exists is not exclusixve to medicine, exven though it has
a particularly detrimental effect in the fheld. Even the
specter of a conflict of interest raises questions about
the integrity of the information provided. Moreov er,
inloimation disclosed as pait of an institutional policy
or undei govemnent regulation actually resveals
relatively little, it reveals only that the infoimation
may be suspect.46 For these reasons, all disclosures
regarding conflicting interests should he accompanied
by a detailed summary of the circumstances of the
interaction.419
Details in disclosure that qualify the phy sician's
expertise and timne spent are necessary to ensure that
the data describes the interests of each party in a
meaningful manner so In this vsay, the circumstances
under wxhich gifts are receisved, consulting or speaking
tees are paid, and other types of transfers are provided
in context and tell a more complete story about the
interests." The time Frame during which the holder of
the interest invested in the company, the circumstances
and reasons surrounding this investment, and even a
pro-rated amount of the holding are all necessary to
provide a more meaningful set of data with which one
can make a more informed decision about the integrity
of the information. As another example, payments
made to health care providers for involvement in clinical
research are often based on the intricacy or duration of
the trial, providing a helpful context for payments that
may otherwise seen exceedingly large or inappropriate.
Further, the remuneration compensates for a physician's
time spent away from his or her own practice, another
detail that puts payment schemes into perspective.
The key, therefore, is to ensure that the information
provided is meaningful in the sense that it reveals the
interest accurately. Providing context makes for a truly
fidl disclosure and provides a complete set of data with
which an affected party can more effectively analyze
and manage the competing interests.
Despite proper disclosure, the Brennan study suggests
an unconscious "impulse to reciprocate" for the donation
of items and services renders interactions between
industry and health care professionals by definition
unmanageable.52 Its basis in "soft sciences," however,
has made the Brennan study vulnerable to skepticism,
especially amongst physicians. The theory can even
be -viewed as insulting: few physicians are willing to
risk their professional reputation, let alone the health of
a patient, on the influence of a logo pad or pen." More
importantly, physicians generally rely on their training
and experience in their prescribing and decision-
making and are thus unlikely to be persuaded otherwise
in the absence of true scientific data. Unlike conflicts
of interest in other fields, a conflict of interest that arises
in health care is not merely an inquiry into whether
"reasonable onlookers would find it plausible that the
average persion could be swayed by a temptation."
Physicians are held to a higher standard both legally
and ethically;' demoting their clinical judgment to
that of the reasonable person seems in and of itself
unreasonable.56
Information for the purposes of managing untoward
interactions and disclosing conflicts of interests also
has the unintended effect of rev ealing industry -prosvider
inteiactions that lose theii value vshen disclosed betore
a specific peiiod oi time. Device manufacturers in par-
ticular tend to be smaller start-up companies vsith little
capital, but conduct research and dev elopment for
intiricate and sometimes unknown techniques or
equipment. This type of innosvation requires expei't
knossledge and clinical experience that at times
only fewv possess: either the comnpany 's insvestors
or specialists in a field. In addition, consulting or
researching arrangements are sometimes made with
physicians where the physician is so well known in
his or her community that disclosure of the interaction
will "tip otf' competitors as to developing goals of a
company. Under the rebuttable presumption approach,
this situation makes the case for proceeding with an
industry-provider interaction despite a conflict of
interest. More importantly, it suggests that certain
disclosures may cause more harm than good when they
automatically de-value the purposes of an interaction
by negating a competitive edge.
The O.,#verarching -Interest
Arguably, "linappropriate industry influence may
be dangerous because it threatens to compromise
physicians' judgment and prescribing patterns based
on gifts or monetary incentives about wi fhich patients
are conpletely unawre,"s highlighting the value
of individual choice in the health care system.58
When individuals are able to consider personally the
implications that an interaction may have on treatment
received or other health care choices,. the principle of
autonomy is maintained. Autonomy requires acquiring
permission to perform medical procedures, providing
ways to accommodate patient participation in treatment
choices, and otherwise diminishing the chances that
their person is abused.59 These examples encompass
a right that seems fundamental: the "right to know"
as much information as is available. The value placed
on the patients' "right to know" in the context of
conflicts of interest mirrors its significance in health care
issues that are similarly value-based, namely, infonned
consent and confidentiality of health care inforation.
That the U.S. health care system is a communal system
with a strong emphasis on individual rights justifies a
recent court decision finding that the free flow of ideas
is fundamental to research and science.6o Ihe holding
that the patients had given up ownership rights to tissue
used in university research studies by granting consent
demonstrates how respect for autonomy sufficiently
mitigates the taking of individual information in pursuit
ot greater knowxledge. ' Indeed, the premium placed on
proxviding infoimed consent is so high that any trade-
otfs associated xvith it. such as the phy sician's tune
spent supply ing the requisite informnation, are generally
xviewxed as "de minimus or not xxorth analy zing."6
Prosviding for autonomnous choice in health care decision-
making protects research and choices in care that xxould
otherxxise be xviexwed as unusable or compronmised.
L ikexwise, xwithout the disclonsure of confl1icts of interestL
a patient's choice of treatment xwould not be truly
informed and industry-provider interactions would not
move forward in pursuit of improved health care."
Disclosure of pertinent information enables health care
consumers to make more intormed choices.64 Thus,
disclosure adequately manages conflicts of interest
because it provides for patient autonomy in health care
decision-making.
IThere are few cases of documented harm as a result
of conflicts of interest arising out of industry-provider
interactions. Instances where an individual is physically
or financially hainedxwhen confidentiality of health care
records is breached are similarly negligible. L Even the
recent breaches in confidentiality of "celebrity" health
records at the University of Los Angeles, California
Medical Center, where it would be foreseeable that a
person in the public eye could indeed be injured by the
leaking of health care information, left only the snooping
employees harmed through loss of employment or other
retribution. The outcome indicates that the breach itself
was the offense, not the loss of privacy or release of
information.66 Nonetheless, we continue to "mark"
health care records as confidential and to have strong
negative reactions when that interest is breachedf67
Likewise, protection against even the idea of unseemly
behavior in industry -provider interactions is valuable
in making informed choices, whether or not tangible
"haim" is likely to occur. At the forefront of decisions
regarding the uses and the disclosures of health care
infoimation is the sanctity of the individual's ability
to make his or her own decisions about those uses and
disclosures. The balance is therefore based on needs:
the patient's need not to have his or her information
disclosed takes priority over the need of an entity (other
than a covered entity authorized under Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to use and
disclose the information.68 By protecting information
about an individual's state of health, diagnosis, and
treatment, it seems that what we are actually protecting
is the long-regarded principle of autonomy.69
Health care records are confidential because they
contain information that we have determined is the
type of information that we must cover and conceal
to the greatest extent possible. Similarly xwe must
balance wxhether the needs of industry or health care
protessionals to keep information undisclosed to
prexvent the unintended consequences described aboxve
tiump the needs ot health caie consumers to knoxx
the information in those situations ? The trade-otts
that occur wxhen cinpowxering health care consumers
xxith information must be considered to the extent
that they may hann the patient. Disclosures that lead
to unintended consequences, such as phy sician recusal
fi-om interactions or other compromises that hinder
innovation, should be better managed because the
patient is at the receiving end of the information. In the
end the information that is disclosed contributes to the
patient's ability to make autonomous choices. As the
beneficiaries of new medical technology, especially
when providers are fully informed on its appropriate
dissemination, the welfare of patients seems to be one
objective that can trump the idea of fully informed
autonoIy
VL. Conclusion
Jerome P. Kassirer, former editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine (NEJM), acknowledges that "[a]t
present, the national mood favors individualism, profits,
and entrepreneurship.""' The three major stakeholders
in industry-provider interactions, industry, health care
professionals, and health care consumers, all hold
basic interests: financial return, medical innovation,
and autonomy in health care. While seemingly
incompatible, these interests intersect in more ways
than they diverge when all stakeholders gain from the
promotion of these simultaneous objectives. When
conflicts of interest threaten to deter a health care player
from realizing its interest, disclosure of those interests
maintains the "status quo."73 The key to enabling each
player to assess the risks and the benefits associated
with moving forxard is finding a balance between any
competing interests and the disclosure thereof.74 to
the extent that unintended consequences are mitigated,
disclosure simultaneously promotes patient autonomy
while allowing medical innovation to move forward
through designated interactions aimed at sharing and
exchanging information about health care products
and ideas.
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